We study a two-stage model in which the information processed by consumers at the first stage (advance selling stage) is endogenously determined. In the model, the firm decides whether to introduce an advance selling program, chooses what attribute information to disclose, and determines an advance selling price and a retail price. Forward-looking consumers strategically choose, based on the disclosed information, to buy in advance or to make a purchase decision at the second stage (retail stage) when all information is revealed. We characterize the firm's optimal choice on the advance selling program and the strategy of information disclosure. In particular, we show that the firm always prefers to introduce the advance selling program except when underlying consumer preferences are extremely homogenous. In addition, we find that fully revealing horizontal product information at the advance selling stage is never optimal to the firm, but revealing either partial or no product information can be optimal depending on the underlying consumer preferences. Our finding that partial information disclosure is sometimes optimal to the firm is in contrast to the result in the literature of horizontal information provision that a firm maximizes profit by revealing either no or full information to consumers.

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提前销售计划：何时介绍以及告知消费者什么

我们研究了一个两阶段模型，其中消费者在第一阶段（预售阶段）处理的信息是内生决定的。在该模型中，企业决定是否引入预售计划，选择披露哪些属性信息，并确定预售价格和零售价格。前瞻性消费者根据披露的信息进行战略性选择，是提前购买还是在所有信息都披露的第二阶段（零售阶段）做出购买决定。我们描述了公司在预售计划和信息披露策略上的最优选择。特别是，我们表明该公司总是更喜欢引入预售计划，除非潜在的消费者偏好非常同质。此外，我们发现，在预售阶段完全披露横向产品信息对公司来说永远不是最优的，但根据潜在的消费者偏好，披露部分或不披露产品信息可能是最优的。我们发现部分信息披露有时对公司来说是最优的，这与横向信息提供文献中的结果形成对比，即公司通过不向消费者披露或向消费者披露全部信息来最大化利润。