Moral extremists argue for highly demanding duties of beneficence on the ground that accepting a more moderate position commits us to denying the common-sense moral intuition elicited by easy rescue cases (such as Singer’s famous drowning child case). I argue that a moderate duty of beneficence is consistent with this intuition in light of what I call aggregationism, the view that the large aggregate cost of performing many low-cost acts of beneficence is relevant to what moral agents may do in cases where they face multiple low-cost occasions to rescue. After demonstrating how the debate between moderates and extremists turns on the truth of aggregationism, I defend aggregationism against the challenge that it is inconsistent with respecting the separateness of persons.

道德极端主义者主张高要求的慈善义务，理由是接受更温和的立场会使我们否认容易救援案件（例如辛格著名的溺水儿童案件）引发的常识性道德直觉。根据我所谓的聚合主义，我认为适度的慈善义务与这种直觉是一致的，即执行许多低成本的慈善行为的巨额总成本与道德主体在他们面临的情况下可能采取的行动有关。多次低价救援。在展示了温和派和极端主义者之间的辩论如何转向聚合主义的真相之后，我捍卫聚合主义，以对抗它与尊重人的分离性不一致的挑战。