Avoiding the tragedy of the commons requires altruists to incur some losses to benefit the group. Although specific rules and self-enforcing agreements could help maintain the cooperation system stable, the costly recognition and free-rider problem are still questioned these two cooperation maintenance mechanisms. We here considered the situation of both exit costs and exit benefits in the asymmetric prisoner's dilemma game and introduced a super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating, where players adjust strategies in line with their payoffs and aspirations. If their payoffs reach or exceed the aspiration levels, which may be rational or super-rational, they keep their strategies. Otherwise, they imitate a local neighbor's strategy. We explored this rule in the structured and well-mixed population. The results show that super-rationality and asymmetry could together promote cooperation when exit costs exist. With exit benefit, super-rationality promotes cooperation in both structures and asymmetry only works in the well-mixed population. This suggests that the introduced strategy updating rule could sustain cooperation among egoists with exit rights.

避免公地悲剧需要利他主义者承担一些损失以使群体受益。虽然具体的规则和自我执行的协议可以帮助维持合作体系的稳定，但代价高昂的承认和搭便车问题仍然是这两种合作维持机制的质疑。我们在这里考虑了非对称囚徒困境博弈中退出成本和退出收益的情况，并引入了一种超理性的愿望诱导策略更新，玩家根据自己的收益和愿望调整策略。如果他们的回报达到或超过期望水平，这可能是理性的或超理性的，他们会保留他们的策略。否则，他们会模仿当地邻居的策略。我们在结构化和混合良好的人群中探索了这一规则。结果表明，在存在退出成本的情况下，超理性和不对称可以共同促进合作。有了退出利益，超理性促进了两种结构的合作，而不对称只在混合良好的人群中起作用。这表明引入的策略更新规则可以维持具有退出权的利己主义者之间的合作。