Many philosophers identify knowledge of subjective experience as our sole epistemic bedrock of absolute certainty. Illusionism is the view that subjective experience does not exist, and that our belief in the existence of subjective experience is due to a persistent cognitive or meta-cognitive illusion of some sort. I argue that illusionism entails an absurd epistemic consequence: that our current epistemic situation is consistent with the possible truth of absolute nihilism, which is the view that nothing whatsoever exists. Since it is epistemically impossible that absolute nihilism is true, and the only way to prevent this epistemic possibility is by denying illusionism, I hold that illusionism ought to be rejected.

中文翻译：

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为什么关于意识的幻觉是令人难以置信的

许多哲学家将主观经验的知识视为我们绝对确定性的唯一认识基石。幻觉主义认为主观经验不存在，我们相信存在主观经验是由于某种持续的认知或元认知错觉。我认为幻觉主义带来了一个荒谬的认知后果：我们当前的认知状况与绝对虚无主义的可能真理一致，即认为什么都不存在。由于绝对虚无主义在认知上是不可能的，而防止这种认知可能性的唯一方法是否认幻觉，我认为应该拒绝幻觉。