This article surveys the latest research on risky-choice framing effects, focusing on the implications for rational decision-making. An influential program of psychological research suggests that people's judgements and decisions depend on the way in which information is presented, or ‘framed’. In a central choice paradigm, decision-makers seem to adopt different preferences, and different attitudes to risk, depending on whether the options specify the number of people who will be saved or the corresponding number who will die. It is standardly assumed that such responses violate a foundational tenet of rational decision-making, known as the principle of description invariance. We discuss recent theoretical and empirical research that challenges the dominant ‘irrationalist’ narrative. These approaches typically pay close attention to how decision-makers represent decision problems (including their interpretation of numerical quantifiers or predicate choice) and they highlight the need for a more robust characterization of the description invariance principle. We conclude by indicating avenues for future research that could bring us closer to a complete—and potentially rationalizing—explanation of framing effects.

中文翻译：

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风险选择框架和理性决策

本文调查了有关风险选择框架效应的最新研究，重点关注对理性决策的影响。一项有影响力的心理学研究计划表明，人们的判断和决定取决于信息呈现或“构架”的方式。在中心选择范式中，决策者似乎对风险采取不同的偏好和不同的态度，这取决于选项是指定将获救的人数还是相应的死亡人数. 通常假设此类响应违反了理性决策的基本原则，即描述不变性原则。我们讨论了最近挑战占主导地位的“非理性主义”叙事的理论和实证研究。这些方法通常密切关注决策者如何表示决策问题（包括他们对数值量词或谓词选择的解释），并且它们强调需要对描述不变性原则进行更稳健的表征。最后，我们指出了未来研究的途径，这些途径可以使我们更接近于对框架效应的完整且可能合理化的解释。