We develop a model of international tariff negotiations to study the design of the institutional rules of the GATT/WTO. A key principle of the GATT/WTO is its most-favored-nation (MFN) requirement of nondiscrimination, a principle that has long been criticized for inviting free-riding behavior. We embed a multisector model of international trade into a model of interconnected bilateral negotiations over tariffs and assess the value of the MFN principle. Using 1990 trade flows and tariff outcomes from the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO negotiations, we estimate the model and use it to simulate what would happen if the MFN requirement were abandoned and countries negotiated over discriminatory tariffs. We find that if tariff bargaining in the Uruguay Round had proceeded without the MFN requirement, it would have wiped out the world real income gains that MFN tariff bargaining in the Uruguay Round produced and would have instead led to a small reduction in world real income relative to the 1990 status quo.

中文翻译：

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多方关税谈判的量化分析

我们开发了一个国际关税谈判模型来研究 GATT/WTO 的制度规则的设计。关贸总协定/世贸组织的一个关键原则是其最惠国待遇 (MFN) 的非歧视要求，这一原则长期以来一直因招致搭便车行为而受到批评。我们将国际贸易的多部门模型嵌入到相互关联的双边关税谈判模型中，并评估了最惠国原则的价值。使用 1990 年 GATT/WTO 乌拉圭回合谈判的贸易流量和关税结果，我们估计了该模型，并使用它来模拟如果放弃最惠国待遇要求并且各国就歧视性关税进行谈判会发生什么。我们发现，如果乌拉圭回合的关税谈判在没有最惠国待遇要求的情况下进行，