The green research and development (R&D) cooperation between supplier and manufacturer is becoming more common. This study focuses on the R&D cooperation between one common supplier and two competing manufacturers and investigates the impact of spillover rates, R&D efficiencies, competition level on the equilibrium solutions. The supplier is the Stackelberg leader, who choose to offer a cooperation proposal to one or both of the manufacturers. The manufacturers decide if they are willing to accept the cooperation independently. There are possibly four scenarios, namely, non-cooperation between the supplier and the manufacturers ($C_0$), the supplier cooperates with manufacturer $i$ alone ($C_i,i=1,2$) and the supplier cooperates with both manufacturers ($C_{1+2}$). Then the supplier and the manufacturers decide their investment levels simultaneously. The supplier decides the same wholesale price for both manufacturers and the manufacturers decide their selling prices. We find that the supplier’s investment level increases with the technology spillover rates but the manufacturers’ investment levels with respect to the technology spillover rates depend on its R&D efficiencies and the competition level. The supplier’s investment level is not influenced by the manufacturers’ R&D efficiencies, but its wholesale price is affected by each player’s R&D efficiency. Moreover, the R&D efficiencies of manufacturers have a crucial influence on each player’s cooperation preference. The supplier prefers $C_{1+2}$ when both manufacturers’ R&D efficiencies are high or low, otherwise, it prefers $C_i$. However, the manufacturers prefer $C_i$ to $C_{1+2}$. Finally, we reveal the overall equilibrium cooperation outcomes. Specially, the manufacturers will be forced to accept the supplier’s proposal of $C_{1+2}$ when their R&D efficiencies are relatively low. The practical implications are also discussed to provide guidelines for firms to make cooperation decisions.

供应商和制造商之间的绿色研发 (R&D) 合作正变得越来越普遍。本研究侧重于一个共同供应商和两个竞争制造商之间的研发合作，并调查溢出率、研发效率、竞争水平对均衡解决方案的影响。供应商是 Stackelberg 的领导者，他选择向其中一个或两个制造商提供合作建议。制造商自行决定是否愿意接受合作。可能有四种情况，即供应商和制造商之间不合作（$C_0$)，供应商与制造商合作 $\mathrm{一世}$ 独自的 （$C_{\mathrm{一世}},\mathrm{一世}=1,2$) 并且供应商与两个制造商合作 ($C_{1+2}$）。然后供应商和制造商同时决定他们的投资水平。供应商为两个制造商决定相同的批发价格，制造商决定他们的销售价格。我们发现供应商的投资水平随着技术溢出率的增加而增加，而制造商在技术溢出率方面的投资水平取决于其研发效率和竞争水平。供应商的投资水平不受制造商研发效率的影响，但其批发价格受每个参与者的研发效率影响。而且，制造商的研发效率对每个参与者的合作偏好有着至关重要的影响。供应商更喜欢$C_{1+2}$ 当两个厂商的研发效率高或低，否则，它更喜欢 $C_{\mathrm{一世}}$. 然而，制造商更喜欢$C_{\mathrm{一世}}$ 到 $C_{1+2}$. 最后，我们揭示了整体均衡合作结果。特别是，制造商将被迫接受供应商的建议$C_{1+2}$当他们的研发效率相对较低时。还讨论了实际意义，为公司做出合作决策提供指导。