Abstract

When Ferdinand VII was restored to the throne in 1814, Spain attempted to return to the pre-war status quo. Domestically this suited an exhausted people, but internationally it proved disastrous. Elsewhere, ‘Restoration’ was understood more flexibly: that war with Napoleon had transformed the continent, and that things could simply not have gone back to the way they were. Previous interpretations for Spanish failure at Vienna emphasise weakness, either individual or collective, and these remain true. But weakness was not necessarily a barrier to diplomatic success. Instead, this article argues that Spain’s failure lies in its conceptualisation of itself as a pre-war state. This meant that, rather than co-operate and compromise, it clung jealously to narrow dynastic or retributive aims. The dissolution of the Cádiz Cortes excluded the political elite from government and further hampered efforts as the representatives from the other powers increasingly formed a European network with friends and contacts among this excluded Spanish elite. Its inability to collaborate saw Spain side-lined in the Seventh Coalition, and its subsequent short-lived incursion into France was widely condemned. It was a failure which not only affected Spain at Vienna, but one which also had longer-term implications for its place in Europe.

摘要

1814年斐迪南七世重新登基时，西班牙试图恢复战前的现状。在国内，这适合疲惫的人们，但在国际上却是灾难性的。在其他地方，“恢复”的理解更为灵活：与拿破仑的战争已经改变了大陆，事情根本不可能回到原来的样子。以前对西班牙在维也纳失败的解释强调个人或集体的弱点，这些仍然是正确的。但软弱不一定是外交成功的​​障碍。相反，本文认为西班牙的失败在于其将自己概念化为战前国家。这意味着它不是合作和妥协，而是嫉妒地固守狭隘的王朝或报复性目标。加的斯科尔特斯解散将政治精英排除在政府之外，并进一步阻碍了努力，因为来自其他大国的代表越来越多地与这些被排除在外的西班牙精英之间的朋友和联系形成了一个欧洲网络。由于无法合作，西班牙在第七联盟中被边缘化，随后对法国的短暂入侵受到了广泛谴责。这是一场失败，不仅影响了西班牙在维也纳的比赛，而且还对其在欧洲的地位产生了长期影响。