It is common for an object to present different colour appearances to different perceivers, even when the perceivers and viewing conditions are normal. For example, a Munsell chip might look unique green to you and yellowish green to me in normal viewing conditions. In such cases, there are three possibilities. Ecumenism: both experiences are veridical. Nihilism: both experiences are non-veridical. Inegalitarianism: one experience is veridical and the other is non-veridical. Perhaps the most important objection to inegalitarianism is the ignorance objection, according to which inegalitarianism should be rejected because it is committed to the existence of unknowable colour facts (for example, facts about which objects are unique green). The goal of this paper is to show that ecumenists are also committed to unknowable colour facts. More specifically, I argue that, with the exception of colour eliminativism, all major philosophical theories of colour are committed to unknowable colour facts.

中文翻译：

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不可知的颜色事实

一个物体向不同的感知者呈现不同的颜色外观是很常见的，即使感知者和观察条件是正常的。例如，在正常观看条件下，Munsell 芯片在您看来可能是独特的绿色，而在我看来是黄绿色。在这种情况下，存在三种可能性。普世主义：两种经验都是真实的。虚无主义：两种体验都是不真实的。不平等主义：一种经验是真实的，另一种是非真实的。也许对不平等主义最重要的反对是无知反对，根据这种反对，不平等主义应该被拒绝，因为它致力于存在不可知的颜色事实（例如，关于哪些物体是独特的绿色的事实）。这篇论文的目的是表明，普世主义者也致力于不可知的颜色事实。