This paper addresses epistemic aspects of the phenomenon of obstetric violence—which has been described as a kind of gender violence—mainly from the perspective of recent theories on epistemic injustice. I argue that what is behind the dismissal of women’s voices in labor is mainly how the birthing subject, in general, is conceived. Thus, I develop a link between the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in labor and the marked irrationality that is seen as a core characteristic of birthing subjects: an irrationality that appears to be always at odds with the kind of knowledge that is, wrongly, privileged within medicalized childbirth. I use Miranda Fricker’s analysis to argue that a central part of obstetric violence involves laboring women being “wrongfully undermined specifically in their capacity as knowers” (2007: 9): they are disbelieved in the labor room because of a double prejudice, one deriving simply from their condition as women, the second involving the kind of knowledge that many women find useful in the process of birthing. Women in labor thus suffer from both systematic and incidental kinds of testimonial injustice.

本文主要从最近关于认知不公正的理论的角度讨论产科暴力现象的认知方面——它被描述为一种性别暴力。我认为，在分娩中女性声音被忽视的背后，主要是生育主体的总体构思方式。因此，我在分娩过程中的证词不公现象与被视为分娩主体核心特征的显着非理性之间建立了联系：这种非理性似乎总是​​与那种错误地享有特权的知识相矛盾。医疗分娩。我使用米兰达·弗里克 (Miranda Fricker) 的分析来论证产科暴力的一个核心部分涉及劳动妇女“被错误地损害，特别是作为知情者”(2007: 9)：由于双重偏见，她们在产房被怀疑，一个是因为她们作为女性的条件，第二个是关于许多女性在分娩过程中发现有用的知识。因此，分娩中的妇女遭受系统性和偶然性的证词不公正。