This paper investigates the pricing model between an incumbent ferry firm and a new-entrant sea bus firm. First, we study the influences of sea buses entering the ferry market. Next, based on the differences in power structures, we analyze the impact of weather on both companies’ operations in Bertrand and two Stackelberg models, and we consider a case in which both firms belong to the same parent firm. Finally, we study the strategies adopted by the ferry firm to protect its market share against the invasion of sea buses. We find that the sea bus firm’s entrance into the ferry market will increase the number of passengers taking ferries. Both companies’ profits are greater in the two Stackelberg models than in the Bertrand model. The two companies’ profits in the Stackelberg models partially rely on the weather. Finally, vicious price competition will lead to losses on both sides.

本文研究了现有渡轮公司和新进入的海上巴士公司之间的定价模型。首先，我们研究了海上巴士进入渡轮市场的影响。接下来，基于权力结构的差异，我们在 Bertrand 和两个 Stackelberg 模型中分析天气对两家公司运营的影响，并考虑两家公司属于同一母公司的情况。最后，我们研究了渡轮公司为保护其市场份额免受海上巴士入侵而采取的策略。我们发现海上巴士公司进入轮渡市场将增加乘坐轮渡的乘客数量。两家公司的利润在两个 Stackelberg 模型中均高于在 Bertrand 模型中的利润。两家公司在 Stackelberg 模型中的利润部分依赖于天气。最后，