We call a decision maker risk averse for losses if that decision maker is risk averse with respect to lotteries having alternatives below a given reference alternative in their support. A two-person bargaining solution is called invariant under risk aversion for losses if the assigned outcome does not change after correcting for risk aversion for losses with this outcome as pair of reference levels, provided that the disagreement point only changes proportionally. We present an axiomatic characterization of the Nash bargaining solution based on this condition, and we also provide a decision-theoretic characterization of the concept of risk aversion for losses.

中文翻译：

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风险规避损失和纳什讨价还价解决方案

我们称决策者风险厌恶损失，如果该决策者对于彩票具有低于给定参考备选方案的备选方案支持风险厌恶。假设分歧点仅按比例变化，如果分配的结果在以该结果作为参考水平对损失的风险规避进行校正后没有改变，则两人谈判解决方案被称为在损失风险规避下不变。我们提出了基于此条件的纳什讨价还价解决方案的公理化特征，并且我们还提供了损失风险规避概念的决策理论特征。