In this paper, I propose and defend a pair of necessary conditions on evidence-based knowledge which bear resemblance to the troubled sensitivity principles defended in the philosophical literature (notably by Fred Dretske). We can think of the traditional principles as simple but inaccurate approximations of the new proposals. Insofar as the old principles are intuitive and used in scientific and philosophical contexts, but are plausibly false, there’s a real need to develop precise and correct formulations. These new renditions turned out to be more cautious, so they won’t be able to do everything the old principled promised they could. For example, they respect closure for knowledge. But these sober formulations, or something like them, might be the best that we can do with respect to sensitivity. And there’s value in understanding the limits to these types of principles.

在本文中，我提出并捍卫了基于证据的知识的一对必要条件，这些条件与哲学文献（尤其是 Fred Dretske）中捍卫的有问题的敏感性原则相似。我们可以将传统原则视为新提案的简单但不准确的近似值。就旧原理而言，它是直观的，并在科学和哲学背景下使用，但似乎是错误的，因此确实需要开发精确和正确的公式。事实证明，这些新的演绎更加谨慎，因此他们将无法做到旧原则所承诺的一切。例如，他们尊重知识的封闭性。但是这些清醒的表述，或类似的东西，可能是我们在敏感性方面所能做的最好的事情。