A group of $n\ge 2$ experts has to pick one winner from a group of $m\ge 2$ candidates. Different experts may have different judgments about who the best candidate is. A social choice rule (SCR) is $q$-supermajoritarian (with $q\ge ⌊\frac{n}{2}⌋+1$) if, whenever a candidate is judged as best by at least $q$ experts, that candidate is considered to be the deserving winner. Experts may be biased and their preferences are not necessarily aligned with their judgments. Then, the social planner has to design a mechanism that implements the SCR. We show that implementability of a $q$-supermajoritarian SCR in an ordinal equilibrium concept requires the group of experts to satisfy a condition of impartiality that depends on $q$ (the higher $q$, the weaker the condition).

一群 $n\ge 2$ 专家必须从一组中选出一名获胜者 $米\ge 2$考生。不同的专家可能对谁是最佳人选有不同的判断。社会选择规则（SCR）是$q$- 绝对多数（与 $q\ge ⌊\frac{n}{2}⌋+1$) 如果，每当一个候选人被至少 $q$专家，该候选人被认为是当之无愧的赢家。专家可能有偏见，他们的偏好不一定与他们的判断一致。然后，社会规划者必须设计一种机制来实现 SCR。我们证明了一个$q$- 序数均衡概念中的绝对多数 SCR 要求专家组满足依赖于公正性的条件 $q$ （越高 $q$，条件越弱）。