This study aims to extend the study of property tax competition to a highly fragmented local context. Applying the tax competition theory to the property tax, I estimate the causal effect of a property tax increase at one level of government on fiscal decisions of another level of overlapping governments. To address endogeneity concerns in jurisdictional overlap, I employ different quasi-experimental approaches based on school bond referenda, using regression discontinuity (RD) and difference-in-differences (DiD) frameworks. The RD and DiD estimates together suggest that an increase in school taxes would eventually lead to higher tax rates in overlapping cities. The findings confirm the existence of tax competition, which is consistent with the yardstick competition model. Furthermore, given the cross-district heterogeneity in taxing capacity and intergovernmental constraints, the results indicate the presence of power dynamics among localities.

本研究旨在将财产税竞争的研究扩展到高度分散的当地环境。将税收竞争理论应用于财产税，我估计了一个级别政府增加财产税对另一级别重叠政府的财政决策的因果影响。为了解决管辖重叠中的内生性问题，我采用了基于学校债券公投的不同准实验方法，使用回归不连续性 (RD) 和差异中的差异 (DiD) 框架。RD 和 DiD 的估计共同表明，学校税的增加最终会导致重叠城市的税率更高。研究结果证实了税收竞争的存在，这与尺度竞争模型是一致的。此外，