Democratic backsliding has multiplied “unprincipled” political principals: governments with weak commitment to the public interest. Why do some bureaucrats engage in voice and guerrilla sabotage to thwart policies against the public interest under “unprincipled principals,” yet others do not? Despite its centrality in contemporary governance, this conundrum has not seen quantitative research. We address this gap with survey evidence from 1,700 Brazilian public servants during the Temer Presidency, widely perceived to lack democratic legitimacy and integrity. We focus on one key explanator: public service motivation (PSM). We argue that bureaucrats with greater PSM are more likely to engage in voice and sabotage of “unprincipled policies,” and exit to avoid implementing “unprincipled policies.” Structural equation models support these hypotheses. Public service-motivated bureaucracies are thus short-run stalwarts against “unprincipled” political principals. Over time, they look to depart, however, leaving “unprincipled” principals a freer hand to pursue policies against the public interest.

中文翻译：

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退出、声音和破坏：无原则政治主体时代的公共服务动机和游击官僚主义

民主的倒退使“无原则”的政治原则成倍增加：政府对公共利益的承诺薄弱。为什么一些官僚在“无原则的原则”下进行言论和游击破坏，以挫败违背公共利益的政策，而另一些官僚却没有？尽管它在当代治理中处于中心地位，但这一难题尚未进行定量研究。我们利用特梅尔总统任期内 1,700 名巴西公务员的调查证据解决了这一差距，这些证据被广泛认为缺乏民主合法性和诚信。我们专注于一个关键的解释：公共服务动机（PSM）。我们认为，具有更大 PSM 的官僚更有可能参与和破坏“无原则的政策”，并退出以避免实施“无原则的政策”。结构方程模型支持这些假设。因此，以公共服务为动力的官僚机构在短期内是反对“无原则的”政治原则的坚定支持者。然而，随着时间的推移，他们希望离开，让“无原则”的负责人更自由地推行违背公共利益的政策。