Only a few empirical studies have investigated principal-agent problems in transportation, notwithstanding the significant attention gained by agency theory in the last decade. The container shipping industry’s charter market exhibits a particular type of principal-agent problems deriving from information asymmetries between charterer and owner. We investigate agency theory in transportation science by analyzing the impact of split incentives and information asymmetries on carbon emissions. To construct a robust panel analysis, we collaborated with a leading maritime NGO to source cross-sector operational information for the period 2010–2019. We show that in the case of container shipping, chartering results in about 8% higher carbon emissions, benchmarked against owner-operated vessels, which can be explained as a consequence of principal-agent problems. We also discuss operational cost increases deriving from levying a carbon price in accordance with the Paris Agreement targets. We present guidance to respective carbon policies and point to incentives to overcome underinvestment in green technologies.

尽管代理理论在过去十年中得到了极大的关注，但只有少数实证研究调查了运输中的委托代理问题。集装箱航运业的租船市场表现出一种特殊类型的委托代理问题，原因是租船人和船东之间的信息不对称。我们通过分析分裂激励和信息不对称对碳排放的影响来研究交通科学中的代理理论。为了构建稳健的面板分析，我们与一家领先的海事非政府组织合作，获取 2010-2019 年期间的跨部门运营信息。我们表明，在集装箱运输的情况下，以业主经营的船舶为基准，租赁导致碳排放量增加约 8%，这可以解释为委托代理问题的结果。我们还讨论了根据《巴黎协定》目标征收碳价导致的运营成本增加。我们为各自的碳政策提供了指导，并指出了克服绿色技术投资不足的激励措施。