Abstract

Dworkin, Schauer and others have argued that the last step of the proportionality test, ie balancing, is subject to a significant asymmetry. While we could balance interests against each other, we could not do so with rights, lest we destroy the unique normative status of rights. If this asymmetry exists, the applicability of balancing would be considerably limited. I analyse the asymmetry thesis and discuss its merits and weaknesses. I then demonstrate how we can accommodate the rationale behind the asymmetry thesis within the principles theory’s account of balancing. My article confirms that proportionality adjudication includes the balancing of rights and interests.

中文翻译：

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平衡权益：重构不对称命题

摘要

德沃金、绍尔和其他人认为，比例测试的最后一步，即平衡，受到严重不对称的影响。虽然我们可以平衡彼此的利益，但我们不能用权利来平衡，以免破坏权利的独特规范地位。如果存在这种不对称性，平衡的适用性将受到很大限制。我分析了不对称论文并讨论了它的优点和缺点。然后，我将展示我们如何将不对称论题背后的基本原理纳入原则理论的平衡解释中。我的文章证实了比例性裁决包括权利和利益的平衡。