ABSTRACT

To decide to A, as I conceive of it, is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to A. I argue that ordinary instances of practical deciding, so conceived, falsify the following two theses: (1) Necessarily, S intentionally A-s only if S intends to A; (2) In every actual case of intentionally A-ing, the agent intends to A. But I also argue that actions of some other types falsify these theses. Practical deciding is not unique in this respect. In another respect, however, it may be unique. It may be the only source of counterexamples to the thesis that, in any actual case of intentional action, some relevant intention is at work. In addition, actual instances of deciding to A may differ from other actual basic actions in that whereas the latter are successful attempts to A, actual agents never try to decide to A (as opposed to trying to decide what to do and to trying to bring it about that they decide to A).

摘要

正如我所设想的那样，决定 A 是对 A 形成一个意图的瞬间心理活动。仅当 S 打算 A 时；(2) 在每一个有意 A-ing 的实际案例中，代理都打算 A。但我也认为其他一些类型的行为会证伪这些论点。在这方面，实际决策并不是独一无二的。然而，在另一方面，它可能是独一无二的。这可能是本文反例的唯一来源，即在任何实际的故意行为案例中，一些相关的意图在起作用。此外，决定 A 的实际实例可能与其他实际基本动作的不同之处在于，后者是对 A 的成功尝试，