A contestant’s effort depends on her knowledge of her rival’s type. This knowledge is often limited in real-life contests. We propose a model where the principal of a contest has commitment power to verifiably disclose contestants’ types. We investigate the optimal disclosure policy to stimulate contestants’ efforts. Full disclosure stimulates more (less) effort than full concealment if high-types are more (less) likely than low-types. However, regardless of the likelihood of types, the optimal policy is that of contingent disclosure; it is optimal to commit to disclosing if both contestants are high types and concealing otherwise.

中文翻译：

---

利用信念以最佳方式披露参赛者的类型

参赛者的努力取决于她对对手类型的了解。这些知识在现实生活中的比赛中往往是有限的。我们提出了一种模型，其中竞赛负责人具有可验证地披露参赛者类型的承诺权。我们调查了激励参赛者努力的最佳披露政策。如果高类型比低类型更有可能（更少），则完全披露比完全隐藏会刺激更多（更少）的努力。然而，无论类型的可能性如何，最佳策略是有条件披露；如果两个参赛者都是高级类型，最好承诺公开，否则隐瞒。