In Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the United States, firms are either reorganized, acquired, or liquidated. I show that decisions to liquidate often reduce creditor recovery, costing creditors billions of dollars every year. I exploit the within-district random assignment of bankruptcy judges to estimate a structural model of bankruptcy. I estimate that liquidation is frequently chosen when a reorganization would have maximized total creditor recovery. Liquidations involving ”363 sales,” in which managers sell assets without creditor approval, are especially harmful for creditors. I estimate that courts could dramatically improve creditor recovery by assigning liquidations using a statistical model.

在美国第 11 章破产案件中，公司要么被重组，要么被收购，要么被清算。我表明，清算决定通常会减少债权人的回收，每年使债权人损失数十亿美元。我利用破产法官的区域内随机分配来估计破产的结构模型。我估计，当重组可以最大限度地提高总债权人的回收率时，经常会选择清算。涉及“363 销售”的清算，即经理在未经债权人批准的情况下出售资产，对债权人尤其有害。我估计法院可以通过使用统计模型分配清算来显着提高债权人的回收率。