We use a two-stage experiment to study how a short-term subsidy for a new product affects uptake, usage, and future demand for the same product (a new solar lamp). We use an auction design to gauge willingness-to-pay, and randomly vary the strike price across villages to create random variation in purchase prices and uptake across villages. Our main results are that subsidies do not adversely affect subsequent product use, but stimulate uptake. If subsidies depress future willingness-to-pay, then this effect is outweighed by additional learning about the benefits of the new product. The net effect is that short-term subsidies increase future willingness-to-pay. However; prices play an important allocative role, and lowering prices via subsidies encourages uptake by households with low use intensity. We do not find any evidence supporting social learning and anchoring beyond the initial sample of beneficiaries.

我们使用两阶段实验来研究新产品的短期补贴如何影响对同一产品（新太阳能灯）的吸收、使用和未来需求。我们使用拍卖设计来衡量支付意愿，并随机改变村庄之间的执行价格，以在村庄之间创造购买价格和吸收的随机变化。我们的主要结果是补贴不会对后续产品的使用产生不利影响，而是会刺激使用。如果补贴抑制了未来的支付意愿，那么这种影响会被额外了解新产品的好处所抵消。净效应是短期补贴提高了未来的支付意愿。然而; 价格发挥着重要的分配作用，通过补贴降低价格会鼓励使用强度低的家庭采用。