What factors explain variation in decisions to use force in American foreign policy? Consider the Obama administration’s decision to intervene in Libya. Upon assuming office, Obama outlined a foreign policy marked by a self-professed doctrine, ‘don’t do stupid shit’. In short, Obama sought to avoid the unnecessary use of military force, but when the threat of mass atrocity emerged, despite strong protests from senior advisers, he became drawn into the 2011 Libya intervention. By contrast, following chemical weapon attacks in Syria in 2013, Obama reneged on upholding his so-called ‘red-line’, pursuing diplomatic measures even though support for a military response was strong. But what explains this variation? Rationalist perspectives across the board have tended to overrate interpretive efficiency. Yet, such assumptions obscure the capacity for interests to be interpreted in different ways. To redress this issue, I build on discursive institutionalist insights, developing a model to show how principled and cognitive ideas act as weapons in institutional debates, serving to repress or displace information. To show how agents come to rely on principled or cognitive ideas, I develop a three-part model offering two mechanisms – cognitive repression and normative displacement – by which agents displace and repress certain types of information, depending on the ‘form’ in which that information is presented. This enables a more comprehensive understanding of how different interpretations lead to policy variation at critical moments of decision.

哪些因素可以解释美国外交政策中使用武力决定的差异？想想奥巴马政府干预利比亚的决定。上任后，奥巴马概述了一项以自称信条为标志的外交政策，即“不要做蠢事”。简而言之，奥巴马试图避免不必要地使用武力，但当大规模暴行的威胁出现时，尽管高级顾问强烈抗议，他还是被卷入了 2011 年的利比亚干预行动。相比之下，在 2013 年叙利亚发生化学武器袭击之后，奥巴马违背了他所谓的“红线”，尽管对军事反应的支持力度很大，但仍采取外交措施。但是如何解释这种变化呢？全面的理性主义观点倾向于高估解释效率。然而，这种假设掩盖了以不同方式解释利益的能力。为了解决这个问题，我以散漫的制度主义见解为基础，开发了一个模型来展示原则性和认知性思想如何在制度性辩论中充当武器，服务于压制或取代信息。为了展示代理如何依赖原则或认知的想法，我开发了一个由三部分组成的模型，提供了两种机制——认知抑制和规范置换——代理通过这些机制置换和抑制某些类型的信息，具体取决于信息的“形式”信息被呈现。这有助于更全面地了解在决策的关键时刻不同的解释如何导致政策变化。