Abstract

Overt interventions to forcibly promote regimes abroad are often a risky undertaking. If successful, they can replace or rescue regimes and signal resolve in the process. But open meddling can also trigger large-scale escalation, incite nationalist backlash, and harm a state’s reputation. Despite an emerging consensus that states often prefer covert action to avoid these liabilities, leaders sometimes opt for overt action anyway. Why? Drawing on the concept of loss aversion, this article argues that leaders’ tolerance for risk differs depending on whether the goal is to overthrow a foreign regime or prop one up. Because regime rescue approximates loss prevention, leaders are more likely to pursue risky intervention strategies than they are to change regimes, a prospective gain. This framework helps explain why leaders are more likely to accept the risks of overt action when saving a foreign regime and more likely to go covert when deposing one. I evaluate this theory using the Eisenhower administration’s covert regime change efforts in Syria (1956–57) and overt regime rescue attempts in Lebanon (1958).

摘要

在国外强行推行政权的公开干预往往是一项冒险的工作。如果成功，他们可以更换或拯救政权，并在此过程中发出决心。但公开干预也可能引发大规模升级，煽动民族主义反弹，损害国家声誉。尽管各国越来越倾向于采取隐蔽行动来避免这些责任的共识正在形成，但领导人有时还是会选择公开行动。为什么？本文借鉴损失厌恶的概念，认为领导人对风险的容忍度因目标是推翻外国政权还是支持一个外国政权而异。因为政权拯救接近于损失预防，领导者更有可能采取冒险的干预策略，而不是改变政权，这是一种预期的收益。这个框架有助于解释为什么领导人在拯救外国政权时更有可能接受公开行动的风险，而在推翻一个政权时更可能采取隐蔽行动。我使用艾森豪威尔政府在叙利亚（1956-57 年）的秘密政权更迭努力和在黎巴嫩（1958 年）公开的政权救援尝试来评估这一理论。