Reviewed by:

• Heat, Pneuma, and Soul in Ancient Philosophy and Science ed. by Hynek Bartoš and Colin Guthrie King
• Rhodes Pinto

This unfortunately titled volume offers a collection of fourteen essays and two introductions, many of which stem from a 2014 conference, Aristotle and His Predecessors on Heat, Pneuma, and Soul, which is a more honest reflection of the contents, given its exclusion of the Stoics. Of the essays, eight are devoted to Aristotle (mainly to biological and zoological topics), four to Presocratic natural philosophy, one to Plato, and one to the De Spiritu. The poor titling and somewhat oddly circumscribed selection of who and what receives attention, however, do not detract from the quality of the contributions themselves, which is largely excellent.

One highlight is Simon Trépanier's account of soul in Empedocles, the most sophisticated account yet developed. Trépanier argues that soul is a fire-air mix, an early pneuma theory. In animals, this mix is in the blood around the midriff, thus reconciling the reports linking soul to fire or air and to blood while allowing for metempsychosis.

Another highlight is Gábor Betegh's wide-ranging and generally deflationary piece on fire and heat as a source of motion in the Presocratics and some Hippocratics. In particular, his discussion of Democritus constitutes a significant advance in the understanding of Democritus's atomic theory. The piece also features the volume's only discussion of Heraclitus. The understudied Diogenes of Apollonia's ontology receives a dedicated chapter by Bryan Reece, though Reece inexplicably neglects half of the key evidence, namely Diels-Kranz (DK) B5, especially its invocation of tropoi of air and of "what is called 'air' by humans."

Thomas Johansen presents a compelling argument that in the Timaeus the process of nutrition for all living creatures is the causal responsibility of the world-soul (via its rotation and thereby the mixing and separation of the elements). Still, I was left wondering about the teleology. Mortal creatures' nutrition appears not to be an aim of the world-soul, nor is it a stated aim in the Demiurge's crafting of the world-soul. Perhaps the teleological responsibility lies with the visible gods, who form mortals with confining bodies such that nutrition can occur via the world-soul's causation. That fits well with the Demiurge's address to the visible gods (41a–d), though, if correct, it would suggest that the (confining structure of the) body has a slightly greater role in the account of nutrition than Johansen grants.

Several chapters address the motions in sperma within Aristotle's account of reproduction. The interpretation given in Karel Thein's chapter is unlikely to win advocates. Employing a connection suggested at GA II.3, 736b37–737a1, Thein argues that "the motion proper to the seed … is not due to any external mechanical impulse" (193); rather it is, like that of aether in the De Caelo, "due to an inherent animation" (200), which does not involve soul. Hence he asserts that "the state of being animate, ἔμψυχον, is not always and necessarily connected to being a soul or having a soul" (194–95). Even setting aside his claim that Aristotle speaks of aether in the De Caelo as "animate (ἔμψυχος)" (196), for which I find no textual evidence, and the implausible strain on the Greek language, Thein's position leaves problematic how the motion in pneuma is caused. Several remarks—"its power to move itself" (193) and "ongoing self-animation" (196)—evidently treat it as self-motion, while another describes it as "apparently unanalyzable" (196), but neither of those positions squares with Aristotle's understanding of the causation of motion in Physics VIII. [End Page 511]

By contrast, Jessica Gelber's chapter convincingly argues that the motions of heat and cold in the sperma are the "tools" or "intermediate agents" (245) used by—and thus caused by—the nutritive soul of the male parent. Gelber's take dovetails nicely with the following chapter by Patricio Fernandez and Jorge Mittelmann, who find further instances...

审核人：

• 热火，牛马，和灵魂在古代哲学和科学编。作者：Hynek Bartoš 和 Colin Guthrie King
• 罗德平托

这不幸的是名为卷报价十四散文和两个介绍，其中许多来自2014会议干集合，亚里士多德和他的热火，前人牛马，和灵魂，这是内容的一个更诚实的反映，因为它排除斯多葛学派。在这些散文中，八篇是关于亚里士多德的（主要是生物学和动物学主题），四篇是关于前苏格拉底自然哲学的，一篇是关于柏拉图的，一篇是关于德灵图的。然而，糟糕的标题和对谁和什么受到关注的选择有些奇怪，但这并没有降低贡献本身的质量，这在很大程度上是优秀的。

一个亮点是西蒙·特雷帕尼尔 (Simon Trépanier) 在 Empedocles 中对灵魂的描述，这是迄今为止开发的最复杂的描述。特里佩尼尔认为灵魂是火空气混合，早期的精气学说。在动物中，这种混合物存在于腹部周围的血液中，从而使将灵魂与火或空气以及血液联系起来的报告相协调，同时允许轮回。

另一个亮点是 Gábor Betegh 在前苏格拉底和一些希波克拉底中作为运动来源的火和热的广泛和普遍通缩的作品。特别是，他对德谟克利特的讨论构成了对德谟克利特原子理论理解的重大进步。该作品还包含该卷对赫拉克利特的唯一讨论。对阿波罗尼亚本体论未充分研究的第欧根尼（Diogenes）接受了布莱恩·里斯（Bryan Reece）的专门章节，尽管里斯莫名其妙地忽略了一半的关键证据，即 Diels-Kranz (DK) B5，尤其是它对空气的tropoi和“所谓的‘空气’的调用人类。”

托马斯·约翰森提出了一个令人信服的论点，即在Timaeu​​s所有生物的营养过程是世界灵魂的因果责任（通过它的旋转，从而混合和分离元素）。尽管如此，我还是对目的论感到疑惑。凡人生物的营养似乎不是世界灵魂的目标，也不是造物主制造世界灵魂的既定目标。或许目的论的责任在于有形的诸神，他们用限制的身体形成凡人，这样营养就可以通过世界灵魂的因果关系发生。这与造物主对有形众神的讲话（41a-d）非常吻合，不过，如果正确的话，这表明（身体的限制结构）在营养解释中的作用比约翰森承认的要大一些。

有几章讨论了亚里士多德关于生殖的描述中精子的运动。Karel Thein 的章节中给出的解释不太可能赢得拥护者的支持。使用GA II.3, 736b37–737a1 中建议的联系，Thein 认为“适合种子的运动......不是由于任何外部机械冲动”（193）；相反，它就像De Caelo中的以太一样，“由于固有的动画”（200），不涉及灵魂。因此，他断言“有生命的状态，ἔμψυχον，并不总是且必然与成为灵魂或拥有灵魂有关”（194-95）。即使搁置他声称亚里士多德在De Caelo 中谈到以太的说法作为“有生命的（ἔμψυχος）”（196），我没有找到任何文本证据，并且对希腊语的压力令人难以置信，登的立场留下了问题，即如何引起pneuma 中的运动。一些评论——“它移动自身的能力”（193）和“持续自我动画”（196）——显然将其视为自我运动，而另一条则将其描述为“显然无法分析”（196），但这些立场都不是与亚里士多德在物理学八中对运动因果关系的理解相吻合。[第511页结束]

相比之下，杰西卡·盖尔伯的章令人信服地辩称，热和冷的议案sperma是使用“工具”或“中间代理人”（245）由-，从而造成-的父本营养灵魂。Gelber 的观点与 Patricio Fernandez 和 Jorge Mittelmann 的下一章很好地吻合，他们发现了更多的例子......