Reviewed by:

• Individuality and Beyond: Nietzsche Reads Emerson by Benedetta Zavatta
• Kaitlyn Creasy

In her remarkable comparative analysis of the thought of Emerson and Nietzsche, Benedetta Zavatta has several aims, the first of which is to demonstrate the necessity of philology for evaluating Emerson's actual influence on Nietzsche. Though Emerson's influence on Nietzsche's thought is already well known to scholars, her impressive analysis is quite unique in that it enables her reader to evaluate Nietzsche's reception of Emerson from a sound philological basis. (Only Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, American Nietzsche: A History of an Icon and His Ideas [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012], 4–20, pursues a similar approach.) After an insightful first chapter on the historical reception of the Emerson-Nietzsche relation, Zavatta proceeds to establish clear points of influence and disagreement between the two thinkers on the basis of Nietzsche's written responses to Emerson's ideas, especially the marks and marginalia left on his personal copies of Emerson's writings.

Another of Zavatta's aims is to trace the origin of key Nietzschean themes back to Emerson. Indeed, while remaining sensitive to other influential figures for Nietzsche (such as Schopenhauer and von Hartmann), Zavatta convincingly demonstrates Emerson's exceptional influence. In chapter 2, she credibly argues that Nietzsche's understanding of freedom as agency emerged from his engagement with Emerson's thoughts on fate and freedom (25). In chapter 3, she offers a compelling account of the Nietzschean "free spirit" as a version of Emerson's experimental "intellectual nomad" (91). In the fourth chapter, she also traces Nietzsche's critique of pity to Emerson's claim that benevolent actions communicate the "implicit subordination" of the individual receiving the kindness (118). Her findings—these are just a few noteworthy ones—are striking. [End Page 520]

Additionally, Zavatta hopes to "disentangle … interpretative knots in Nietzsche's philosophy" (xv) with Emerson's help. Nietzsche's account of self-cultivation is her central focus, and each interpretative level she explores—for example, framing Nietzsche's "ethical model" as a virtue-ethical variety of "parametric universalism" (71) with Emersonian selfreliance as its core—shows the depth of Nietzsche's debt to Emerson.

Though Zavatta's argument is often thought provoking, some interpretative knots remain tangled. On several occasions, she flags Emerson's pronounced influence on ideas from Nietzsche's middle period. At other times, however, she insists on Emerson's influence on Nietzsche's thought more generally. A specialist may wonder whether certain claims regarding Emerson's influence ought to be limited to early and middle Nietzsche or applied to late Nietzsche only after more substantial argument.

In general, Zavatta's interpretation of Nietzsche is more successful when she limits the scope of her claims and less successful when she does not. One of Zavatta's less convincing conjectures presents Emersonian self-reliance as Nietzsche's "sole universal value" (112), a value he identifies and develops (under the influence of Emerson) in the early and middle works and maintains in his later thought (170–71). There are two main issues with Zavatta's argument for this claim. First, though she presents Emersonian self-reliance as Nietzsche's highest value (104), she does not engage sufficiently with alternative possibilities. It is surprising, for example, that she does not argue against power as Nietzsche's standard of value, given the prevalence of this view in contemporary Nietzsche scholarship (John Richardson, Nietzsche's System [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996]; Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006]) and the fact that she explicitly contrasts her view to that of Paul Katsafanas (Agency and the Foundations of Ethics [New York: Oxford University Press, 2013]), who makes such a claim (71). Second, given the central role that power occupies in Nietzsche's later works—in The Antichrist, he calls "good" anything that "augments the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself, in man" (§2)—it would have made sense for Zavatta to consider a developmental account, according to which self-reliance is the highest value in...

审核人：

• 个性与超越：尼采读贝内达塔·扎瓦塔 (Benedetta Zavatta) 的爱默生
• 凯特琳·克瑞斯

Benedetta Zavatta 在对爱默生和尼采思想的杰出比较分析中有几个目的，第一个目的是证明语言学对于评估爱默生对尼采的实际影响的必要性。尽管爱默生对尼采思想的影响已经为学者所熟知，但她令人印象深刻的分析却非常独特，因为它使读者能够从可靠的语言学基础上评估尼采对爱默生的接受。（只有詹妮弗·拉特纳-罗森哈根，美国尼采：一个偶像及其思想的历史[Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012], 4-20, 追求类似的方法。）在第一章对爱默生-尼采关系的历史接受有深刻见解之后，Zavatta 继续在两派之间建立明确的影响点和分歧点。两位思想家基于尼采对爱默生思想的书面回应，特别是在他个人的爱默生著作副本上留下的标记和边缘。

Zavatta 的另一个目标是将关键的尼采主题的起源追溯到爱默生。事实上，在对尼采的其他有影响力的人物（如叔本华和冯哈特曼）保持敏感的同时，扎瓦塔令人信服地展示了爱默生的非凡影响力。在第 2 章中，她可信地论证了尼采对自由作为能动性的理解源于他与爱默生关于命运和自由的思想的接触 (25)。在第 3 章中，她将尼采的“自由精神”作为爱默生实验性“知识游牧者”的一个版本提供了令人信服的描述 (91)。在第四章中，她还将尼采对怜悯的批判追溯到爱默生的主张，即仁慈的行为传达了接受善意的个人的“隐性从属”（118）。[第520页结束]

此外，扎瓦塔希望在爱默生的帮助下“解开……尼采哲学中的解释性结”（xv）。尼采对自我修养的描述是她的中心焦点，她探索的每个解释层面——例如，将尼采的“伦理模式”构建为以爱默生的自立为核心的“参数普遍主义”（71）的美德伦理变体——表明尼采对爱默生的债务深度。

尽管 Zavatta 的论点经常发人深省，但一些解释上的结仍然纠缠不清。有几次，她指出爱默生对尼采中期思想的显着影响。然而，在其他时候，她更普遍地坚持爱默生对尼采思想的影响。专家可能想知道，关于爱默生影响的某些主张是否应该仅限于早期和中期的尼采，或者只有在经过更实质性的论证之后才适用于晚期的尼采。

总的来说，扎瓦塔对尼采的解释在她限制其主张的范围时更成功，而当她没有限制时则不太成功。扎瓦塔的一个不太令人信服的猜想将爱默生的自力更生作为尼采的“唯一普遍价值”（112），这是他在早期和中期作品中确定和发展（在爱默生的影响下）并在他后期的思想中保持的价值（170– 71)。Zavatta 对这一主张的论证有两个主要问题。首先，尽管她将爱默生的自力更生作为尼采的最高价值（104），但她并没有充分参与替代可能性。例如，令人惊讶的是，鉴于这种观点在当代尼采学术界盛行，她并没有反对权力作为尼采的价值标准（约翰·理查森，尼采体系[纽约：牛津大学出版社，1996 年]；Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life [剑桥，马萨诸塞州：哈佛大学出版社，2006 年]）以及她明确将自己的观点与 Paul Katsafanas 的观点进行对比的事实（Agency and the Foundations of Ethics [纽约：牛津大学出版社，2013 年] )，谁提出这样的要求 (71)。其次，考虑到权力在尼采后期作品中的核心作用——在《敌基督》中，他将任何“增强人的权力感、权力意志、权力本身”（§2）的东西称为“好”——它会Zavatta 考虑发展帐户是有道理的，根据该帐户，自力更生是……的最高价值。