Italy and Germany have similar geographical differences in firm productivity—with the North more productive than the South in Italy and the West more productive than the East in Germany—but have adopted different models of wage bargaining. Italy sets wages based on nationwide contracts that allow for limited local wage adjustments, while Germany has moved toward a more flexible system that allows for local bargaining. We find that Italy exhibits limited geographical wage differences in nominal terms and almost no relationship between local productivity and local nominal wages, while Germany has larger geographic wage differences and a tighter link between local wages and local productivity. As a consequence, in Italy, low-productivity provinces have higher non-employment rates than high-productivity provinces, because employers cannot lower wages, while in Germany the relationship between non-employment and productivity is significantly weaker. We conclude that the Italian system has significant costs in terms of forgone aggregate earnings and employment because it generates a spatial equilibrium where workers queue for jobs in the South and remain unemployed while waiting. If Italy adopted the German system, aggregate employment and earnings would increase by 11.04% and 7.45%, respectively. Our findings are relevant for other European countries.

中文翻译：

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工资平等化和地区分配不当：来自意大利和德国各省的证据

意大利和德国在企业生产力方面有着相似的地域差异——意大利的北方比南方的生产力更高，而德国的西方比东方的生产力更高——但采用了不同的工资谈判模式。意大利根据允许当地工资调整有限的全国性合同确定工资，而德国则朝着允许当地谈判的更灵活的制度迈进。我们发现，意大利的名义工资地域差异有限，当地生产率与当地名义工资之间几乎没有关系，而德国的地域工资差异较大，当地工资与当地生产率之间的联系更紧密。因此，在意大利，低生产力省份的非就业率高于高生产力省份，因为雇主不能降低工资，而在德国，非就业与生产力之间的关系明显较弱。我们得出的结论是，意大利系统在放弃总收入和就业方面具有显着成本，因为它产生了一种空间平衡，即工人在南部排队等候工作，而在等待时仍然失业。如果意大利采用德国制度，总就业和收入将分别增长 11.04% 和 7.45%。我们的研究结果与其他欧洲国家相关。如果意大利采用德国制度，总就业和收入将分别增长 11.04% 和 7.45%。我们的研究结果与其他欧洲国家相关。如果意大利采用德国制度，总就业和收入将分别增长 11.04% 和 7.45%。我们的研究结果与其他欧洲国家相关。