We compare in a laboratory experiment two audit-based tax compliance mechanisms that collect fines from those found non-compliant. The mechanisms differ in the way fines are redistributed to individuals who were either not audited or audited and found to be compliant. The first, as is the case in most extant tax systems, does not discriminate between the un-audited and those found compliant. The second targets the redistribution in favor of those found compliant. We find that targeting increases compliance when paying taxes generates a social return. We do not find any increase in compliance in a control treatment where individuals audited and found compliant receive symbolic rewards. We conclude that existing tax mechanisms have room for improvement by rewarding those audited and found compliant.

我们在实验室实验中比较了两种基于审计的税收合规机制，这些机制向发现不合规的人收取罚款。这些机制的不同之处在于，将罚款重新分配给未经审计或经审计但符合规定的个人的方式。第一，与大多数现存税收制度的情况一样，不区分未经审计的和发现合规的。第二个目标是重新分配，有利于那些发现合规的人。我们发现，当纳税产生社会回报时，定位会增加合规性。我们没有发现在控制处理中合规性有任何增加，其中审计并发现合规的个人获得象征性奖励。我们的结论是，通过奖励那些经过审计并发现合规的人，现有的税收机制有改进的余地。