In Responsible Brains (MIT Press, 2018), Hirstein, Sifferd and Fagan apply the language of cognitive neuroscience to dominant understandings of criminal responsibility in criminal law theory. The Authors make a compelling case that, under such dominant understandings, criminal responsibility eventually ‘translates’ into a minimal working set of executive functions (MWS) that are primarily mediated by the frontal lobes of the brain. In so arguing, the Authors seem to unquestioningly accept the law’s view of the “responsible person” as a mixture of cognitive capacities and mechanisms—thereby leaving aside other fundamental aspects of individuals’ human agency. This commentary article offers a critique of the Authors’ rationalist and individualist approach. The critique can be summarized through the following claim: We humans, as responsible beings, are more than our executive functions. This claim articulates through four main points of discussion: (1) role of emotions in moral judgments and behavior; (2) executive functions and normative criteria for legal insanity; (3) impact of adverse situational factors on executive functions; (4) Authors’ account of punishment and, especially, rehabilitation.

在负责任的大脑中（麻省理工学院出版社，2018 年）、Hirstein、Sifferd 和 Fagan 将认知神经科学的语言应用于刑法理论中对刑事责任的主要理解。作者提出了一个令人信服的案例，即在这种占主导地位的理解下，刑事责任最终会“转化”为主要由大脑额叶介导的最低限度的执行功能 (MWS) 工作集。在这样的争论中，作者们似乎毫无疑问地接受了法律将“责任人”视为认知能力和机制的混合体的观点——从而撇开了个人人类能动性的其他基本方面。这篇评论文章对作者的理性主义和个人主义方法提出了批评。可以通过以下声明来总结批评：我们人类，作为负责任的存在，不仅仅是我们的执行功能。这一主张通过四个主要讨论点阐明：（1）情绪在道德判断和行为中的作用；（二）法律失灵的执行职能和规范标准；(3)不利情境因素对执行功能的影响；(4) 作者对惩罚，尤其是康复的描述。