The experimental method has promoted the popularity of neuroscientific research on the human mind. In this interdisciplinary enterprise, the experimental method, with its roots in natural science and experimental psychology, is often uncritically accepted as the royal road to investigate the human mind not only by neuroscientists, but by many philosophers as well, especially those inclined to some form of naturalism. It is rarely disputed that experiments reveal actual states of nature (here: of mind and/or brain). Experimental results are used to picture the human person or subject as an illusionary construct resulting from neuronal interactions. The present paper sketches some of the limitations of neuroscientific experiments in order to demonstrate that cognitive neuroscience is far from relying on firm methodological grounds. Numerous issues still have to be solved, some of which date back to the early days of modern science. At least, to make experiments work, many theoretical presuppositions have to be accepted and decisions of relevance have to be made in the scientific process. This implies that all scientific endeavor is constituted by persons making free decisions for good reasons, despite all reductionist claims to the contrary. The fact that we as scientists have to distinguish relevant from irrelevant aspects of experimental procedures is also crucial for dealing with the current replicability crisis in the life sciences including neuroscience.

实验方法促进了人类心智神经科学研究的普及。在这个跨学科的事业中，植根于自然科学和实验心理学的实验方法常常不加批判地被神经科学家和许多哲学家，尤其是那些倾向于某种形式的哲学家，不加批判地认为是研究人类心灵的捷径。自然主义。实验揭示了自然的实际状态（此处：心灵和/或大脑），这一点很少有争议。实验结果用于将人类或受试者描绘为神经元相互作用产生的幻觉结构。本文概述了神经科学实验的一些局限性，以证明认知神经科学远不依赖于坚实的方法论基础。许多问题仍有待解决，其中一些问题可以追溯到现代科学的早期。至少，为了使实验发挥作用，必须接受许多理论假设，并在科学过程中做出相关的决定。这意味着所有科学努力都是由人们出于充分理由做出自由决定而构成的，尽管所有还原论者都声称相反。事实上，我们作为科学家必须区分实验程序的相关和不相关方面，对于应对包括神经科学在内的生命科学当前的可复制性危机也至关重要。