We examine whether owners' decisions to delegate corporate responsibilities to overconfident managers improve welfare. We develop a dynamic model with product differentiation, where firms compete in cost-reducing research and development (R&D) and output. Before firms compete, each owner makes a strategic decision whether to hire an overconfident manager. The results reveal that when R&D technology is less productive, owners hire overconfident managers who overinvest in cost-reducing R&D. These strategic decisions improve welfare when spillovers are small and R&D productivity is low, or spillovers are large, or product differentiation is strong.

中文翻译：

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差异化双头垄断中的过度自信和福利

我们研究了所有者决定将公司责任委托给过度自信的经理是否会改善福利。我们开发了一个具有产品差异化的动态模型，在该模型中，公司在降低成本的研发 (R&D) 和产出方面展开竞争。在公司竞争之前，每个所有者都会做出是否雇用过度自信的经理的战略决策。结果表明，当研发技术的生产力较低时，所有者会雇用过度自信的经理，他们过度投资于降低成本的研发。当溢出小且研发生产力低、溢出大或产品差异化强时，这些战略决策会改善福利。