The formation and allocation of an emission quota are analyzed in a common agency framework with two stages. First, the principals lobby for the size of the aggregate quota. Second, the principals lobby for the individual slices of the quota. It is shown that the slices are allocated such that the marginal profits of the principals are equalized and that the size of the aggregate quota is either set at the efficient level characterized by the Samuelson’s rule for public goods or distorted from that level. When the quota is distorted from the efficient level it is set such that the aggregate marginal profit is less than the marginal damage, resulting in an overallocation of individual and aggregate quotas. However, efficient level of the quota is obtained in a reasonable special case in which countries take the role of the principals. The results are extended to cover tradable emission permits.

排放配额的形成和分配在一个共同的机构框架下分两个阶段进行分析。首先，校长游说总配额的大小。其次，校长游说配额的各个部分。结果表明，切片的分配使得委托人的边际利润相等，并且总配额的大小要么设置在以萨缪尔森公共物品规则为特征的有效水平上，要么从该水平扭曲。当配额从有效水平扭曲时，它被设置为总边际利润小于边际损害，导致个人配额和总配额的过度分配。然而，配额的有效水平是在国家扮演委托人角色的合理特殊情况下获得的。