This paper explores some variants and aspects of multi-quantificational criteria of existence, examining these in the context of the debate between monism and pluralism in analytical philosophy. Assuming familiarity with the findings to date (summarized in broad terms at the outset), we seek to apply to these the newly introduced concepts of “substitution” and “substitutional model”. Possible applications of formal theories involving multiple types of existential quantifier are highlighted, together with their methods of construction. These considerations then lead to a thesis asserting the irrelevance of both multi-quantificational criteria and assumptions involving quantificational ontology to the debate between monism and pluralism in ontology. Many quantifiers cannot properly distinguish different modes of existence–as we aim to show by furnishing a general method for constructing counter-examples to any theory that assumes that different types of existential quantifier correspond to different modes of existence.

本文探讨了存在的多重量化标准的一些变体和方面，并在分析哲学中一元论和多元论之间的辩论背景下检验这些。假设熟悉迄今为止的研究结果（一开始就概括总结），我们试图将新引入的“替代”和“替代模型”概念应用于这些。强调了涉及多种存在量词的形式理论的可能应用，以及它们的构造方法。然后，这些考虑导致了一篇论文，断言涉及量化本体论的多量化标准和假设与本体论中的一元论和多元论之间的争论无关。