Capital constraint, immensely existing in practice, became major stressors for manufacturers during the green research and development (R & D) triggered by managers integrating green concept into their business models. Considering the initial capital of a capital-constrained manufacturer, this paper formulates a Stackelberg game model comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, to discuss the optimal operation and financing decisions under the bank financing channel and trade credit financing channel, to detect the relationship between the manufacturer’s initial capital and green R & D investment, and to find which financing channel is better by comparing the two financing channels when the same initial capital is set. According to the above analysis, the results find that the capital-constrained manufacturer prefers financing only when meeting certain conditions. Furthermore, financing might be detrimental to the manufacturer but always beneficial to the retailer. Especially, under trade credit financing channel, the profit improvement of the retailer is higher than the manufacturer in the same financing channel, which suggests that the retailer has strong internal motivation to cooperate with the manufacturer from the perspective of financing.

中文翻译：

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厂商资本受限的绿色供应链优化运营与融资决策

在实践中大量存在的资本约束成为制造商在绿色研发（R＆D）过程中的主要压力，管理者将绿色理念融入其商业模式。考虑到资本受限的制造商的初始资本，本文构建了制造商和零售商的 Stackelberg 博弈模型，讨论银行融资渠道和贸易信贷融资渠道下的最优经营和融资决策，检测两者之间的关系。制造商的初始资金和绿色研发投入，在初始资金相同的情况下，通过比较两种融资渠道，找出哪种融资渠道更好。根据以上分析，结果发现，资本受限的制造商只有在满足一定条件时才会倾向于融资。此外，融资可能对制造商不利，但对零售商总是有利的。尤其是在贸易信贷融资渠道下，零售商的利润提升幅度高于同一融资渠道的制造商，说明零售商从融资的角度与制造商合作的内在动力很强。