We estimate how an acquiring firm’s risk changes depending on whether the market initially judges the acquisition to be neutral, strongly negative, or strongly positive for the shareholders of the acquiring firm. We found that for an average neutral acquisition, the annualized standard deviation of an acquiring firm’s total return declines by 5%. In contrast, acquisitions judged negatively by the market result in a 5% increase in total risk, while acquisitions judged positively by the market feature a 30-basis-point increase in total risk. We found the median acquisition to be value creating, not value destructive. Value destruction tends to be concentrated among large firms and to be associated with extreme negative outliers. Acquiring firms with longholder CEOs are more prone to undertake acquisitions and more prone to take on risk, but are less prone to engage in value-destructive acquisitions than acquiring firms with non-longholder CEOs. In this respect, acquiring firms with non-longholder CEOs are more apt to undertake risky bad acquisitions, especially when their prior returns lie above the industry average. In addition, acquiring firms with non-longholder CEOs are less prone to take on good acquisitions that are high in risk. As a general matter, firms with longholder CEOs are less risk sensitive to changes in prior returns than firms with non-longholder CEOs.

中文翻译：

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风险和市场对并购公告的反应

我们估计收购公司的风险如何变化取决于市场最初判断收购对收购公司的股东是中性、强烈负面还是强烈正面。我们发现，对于平均中性收购，收购公司总回报的年化标准差下降 5%。相比之下，市场判断为负面的收购导致总风险增加 5%，而市场判断为积极的收购则总风险增加 30 个基点。我们发现中位数收购是创造价值，而不是破坏价值。价值破坏往往集中在大公司中，并与极端负面的异常值有关。拥有长期持有 CEO 的公司更容易进行收购，也更容易承担风险，但与收购拥有非长期持有 CEO 的公司相比，更不容易进行破坏价值的收购。在这方面，拥有非长期持有 CEO 的收购公司更容易进行有风险的不良收购，尤其是当它们之前的回报高于行业平均水平时。此外，拥有非长期持有 CEO 的收购公司不太可能进行高风险的良好收购。一般而言，与非长期持有 CEO 的公司相比，拥有长期持有 CEO 的公司对先前回报变化的风险敏感性较低。拥有非长期持有 CEO 的收购公司不太可能进行高风险的良好收购。一般而言，与非长期持有 CEO 的公司相比，拥有长期持有 CEO 的公司对先前回报变化的风险敏感性较低。拥有非长期持有 CEO 的收购公司不太可能进行高风险的良好收购。一般而言，与非长期持有 CEO 的公司相比，拥有长期持有 CEO 的公司对先前回报变化的风险敏感性较低。