The centrality of private information in the design of accounting institutions has been explored via agency models that address control concerns as well as disclosure models that amplify valuation issues. This paper derives disclosures by an entrepreneur-owner when both control and valuation concerns are in play. In particular, the disclosures influence stock price not only via a direct impact on valuation of the firm's revenue but also via an indirect impact on the firm's cost of procuring inputs from a self-interested and privately informed upstream supplier. In this setting, disclosures are judiciously designed to influence the supplier's decision to share cost information and to control information rents embedded in the procurement contract within the supply chain. Specifically, in order to convey that information rents are not in the offing and, thus, motivate information sharing by the supplier, the owner has incentives to convey a less “rosy” picture. In effect, when controlling supplier actions also becomes important, the owner discloses some unfavorable revenue news that she would have otherwise withheld and conceals some favorable revenue news that she would have otherwise revealed. Consequently, in our model, the disclosure region is either two-tailed or intermediate, in contrast to the single-tailed disclosure region implied by familiar valuation considerations alone.

中文翻译：

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鉴于控制问题的自愿披露*

私人信息在会计机构设计中的中心地位已经通过解决控制问题的代理模型以及放大估值问题的披露模型进行了探索。本文推导了企业家所有者在控制和估值问题都在发挥作用时的披露。特别是，披露不仅通过对公司收入估值的直接影响，而且通过对公司从自利且知情的上游供应商处采购投入的成本的间接影响来影响股票价格。在这种情况下，披露的设计是明智的，以影响供应商共享成本信息的决定，并控制供应链内采购合同中嵌入的信息租金。具体来说，为了传达信息租金不会出现，从而激励供应商共享信息，所有者有动机传达不那么“乐观”的画面。实际上，当控制供应商行为也变得重要时，所有者披露了一些她本来会隐瞒的不利收入消息，并隐藏了一些她本来会透露的有利收入消息。因此，在我们的模型中，披露区域要么是双尾的，要么是中间的，这与仅由熟悉的估值考虑所暗示的单尾披露区域形成对比。所有者披露了一些她本来会隐瞒的不利收入消息，并隐瞒了一些她本来会透露的有利收入消息。因此，在我们的模型中，披露区域要么是双尾的，要么是中间的，这与仅由熟悉的估值考虑所暗示的单尾披露区域形成对比。所有者披露了一些她本来会隐瞒的不利收入消息，并隐瞒了一些她本来会透露的有利收入消息。因此，在我们的模型中，披露区域要么是双尾的，要么是中间的，这与仅由熟悉的估值考虑所暗示的单尾披露区域形成对比。