This paper explores the sustainability of collusion under either ad valorem or specific taxation in an infinitely repeated duopoly game. I compare ad valorem taxes and specific taxes that generate the same average price or tax revenue in the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. I find that collusion is less sustainable under ad valorem than specific taxation when marginal costs are asymmetric and constant.

中文翻译：

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税收和不对称成本勾结的可持续性

本文探讨了无限重复双头垄断博弈中从价税或从量税下共谋的可持续性。我比较了在阶段博弈的纳什均衡中产生相同平均价格或税收的从价税和从量税。我发现，当边际成本不对称且恒定时，勾结在从价税下比从量税更不可持续。