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The effect of CEO regulatory focus on changes to investments in R&D
Journal of Product Innovation Management ( IF 10.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-19 , DOI: 10.1111/jpim.12591
Richard B. Scoresby 1 , Michael C. Withers 2 , R. Duane Ireland 2
Affiliation  

Research and development (R&D) is a key contributor to organizations’ pursuit of innovation. In turn, CEOs can influence important decisions related to changes in R&D spending—the kind of spending with the potential to lead to innovation. We seek to understand the motivation and conditions under which CEOs may influence R&D spending changes. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, this study investigates how CEO motivation affects changes in firm R&D spending. We explore the effect of CEO promotion and prevention foci on yearly R&D increase. We use a panel dataset of 688 S&P 1500 firms to test our hypotheses. Our findings suggest a negative relationship between CEO prevention focus and R&D increase, while CEO promotion focus produces no meaningful effect. We further test CEO compensation as a moderating mechanism, testing both incentive and fixed CEO compensation. We find that incentive compensation negatively moderates the relationship between CEO promotion focus and R&D increase, and positively moderates the relationship between CEO prevention focus and R&D increase. Additionally, CEO fixed income negatively moderates the relationship between CEO prevention focus and R&D increase. Based on these results we discuss theoretical implications of our findings, including differing effects of CEO regulatory focus on firm risk-taking behavior and how compensation packages may alter those effects. We further discuss the practical necessity for boards of directors to understand both the R&D goals of an organization and the individual motivational orientation of CEOs when crafting compensation packages.

中文翻译:

CEO监管重点对研发投资变化的影响

研发 (R&D) 是组织追求创新的关键因素。反过来,CEO 可以影响与研发支出变化相关的重要决策——这种支出有可能导致创新。我们试图了解 CEO 可能影响研发支出变化的动机和条件。本研究利用监管焦点理论,调查 CEO 动机如何影响公司研发支出的变化。我们探讨了 CEO 晋升和预防重点对年度 R&D 增长的影响。我们使用 688 家标准普尔 1500 公司的面板数据集来测试我们的假设。我们的研究结果表明,CEO 预防重点与研发增加之间存在负相关关系,而 CEO 晋升重点没有产生有意义的影响。我们进一步测试 CEO 薪酬作为一种调节机制,测试激励和固定 CEO 薪酬。我们发现,激励薪酬负向调节 CEO 晋升重点与研发增加之间的关系,并正调节 CEO 预防重点与研发增加之间的关系。此外,CEO 固定收益消极地调节了 CEO 预防重点与研发增加之间的关系。基于这些结果,我们讨论了我们发现的理论意义,包括 CEO 监管重点对公司冒险行为的不同影响,以及薪酬方案如何改变这些影响。我们进一步讨论董事会在制定薪酬方案时了解组织的研发目标和 CEO 的个人动机取向的实际必要性。我们发现,激励薪酬负向调节 CEO 晋升重点与研发增加之间的关系,并正调节 CEO 预防重点与研发增加之间的关系。此外,CEO 固定收益消极地调节了 CEO 预防重点与研发增加之间的关系。基于这些结果,我们讨论了我们发现的理论意义,包括 CEO 监管重点对公司冒险行为的不同影响,以及薪酬方案如何改变这些影响。我们进一步讨论董事会在制定薪酬方案时了解组织的研发目标和 CEO 的个人动机取向的实际必要性。我们发现,激励薪酬负向调节 CEO 晋升重点与研发增加之间的关系,并正调节 CEO 预防重点与研发增加之间的关系。此外,CEO 固定收益消极地调节了 CEO 预防重点与研发增加之间的关系。基于这些结果,我们讨论了我们发现的理论意义,包括 CEO 监管重点对公司冒险行为的不同影响,以及薪酬方案如何改变这些影响。我们进一步讨论董事会在制定薪酬方案时了解组织的研发目标和 CEO 的个人动机取向的实际必要性。
更新日期:2021-08-19
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