It is generally accepted that sight—the capacity to see or to have visual experiences—has the power to give us knowledge about things in the environment and some of their properties in a distinctive way. Seeing the goose on the lake puts me in a position to know that it is there and that it has certain properties. And it does this by, when all goes well, presenting us with these features of the goose. One might even think that it is part of what it is to be a perceptual capacity that it has this kind of epistemological power, such that a capacity that lacked this power could not be perceptual. My focus in this essay is the sense of taste—the capacity to taste things or to have taste experiences. It has sometimes been suggested that taste lacks sight-like epistemological power. I argue that taste has epistemological power of the same kind as does sight, but that as a matter of contingent fact, that power often goes unexercised in our contemporary environment. We can know about things by tasting them in the same kind of way as we can know about things by seeing them, but we often do not. I then consider the significance of this conclusion. I suggest that in one way, it matters little, because our primary interest in taste (in marked contrast to our other senses) is not epistemic but aesthetic. But, I end by suggesting, it can matter ethically.

中文翻译：

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品味的认识论力量

人们普遍认为，视觉——观看或获得视觉体验的能力——能够以独特的方式让我们了解环境中的事物及其某些特性。看到湖上的鹅让我知道它就在那里，并且具有某些特性。它通过在一切顺利时向我们展示鹅的这些特征来做到这一点。人们甚至可能认为，它具有这种认识论的力量是感知能力的一部分，因此缺乏这种能力的能力不可能是感知的。我在这篇文章中的重点是味觉——品尝事物或有味觉体验的能力。有时有人认为，品味缺乏视觉上的认识论力量。我认为品味具有与视觉相同的认识论力量，但作为一个偶然的事实，这种力量在我们当代的环境中经常没有得到运用。我们可以通过品尝来了解事物，就像我们通过看到事物来了解事物一样，但我们通常不这样做。然后我考虑这个结论的重要性。我认为，在某种程度上，它无关紧要，因为我们对品味的主要兴趣（与我们的其他感官形成鲜明对比）不是认知的，而是审美的。但是，我最后建议，这在道德上很重要。然后我考虑这个结论的重要性。我认为，在某种程度上，它无关紧要，因为我们对品味的主要兴趣（与我们的其他感官形成鲜明对比）不是认知的，而是审美的。但是，我最后建议，这在道德上很重要。然后我考虑这个结论的重要性。我认为，在某种程度上，它无关紧要，因为我们对品味的主要兴趣（与我们的其他感官形成鲜明对比）不是认知的，而是审美的。但是，我最后建议，这在道德上很重要。