This paper examines whether directors with multiple directorships affect extent of banks' loan loss provisions in South Asia. Our results indicate that directors with multiple directorships tend to delay the recognition of loan loss provisions. Specifically, we find the existence of a U-shaped relationship between directors with multiple directorships and loan loss provisions, indicating that the delay is more pronounced in the case of moderately busy directors than in that of directors with fewer directorships and time-poor over-boarded directors. This helps directors achieve profitability targets while maintaining their reputations and indicates their optimism about the loans’ future. Our results are robust in terms of accounting for endogeneity concerns, which are addressed using a two-stage least squares regression and entropy-balancing methodology as well as some alternative definitions of ‘multiple directorships’ used in the literature.

本文研究了担任多个董事职务的董事是否会影响南亚银行贷款损失准备金的范围。我们的结果表明，担任多个董事的董事往往会延迟贷款损失准备的确认。具体而言，我们发现具有多个董事职位的董事之间存在 U 型关系，并且 贷款损失准备金，表明中度繁忙董事的延迟比董事较少和时间不足的董事更明显。这有助于董事在保持声誉的同时实现盈利目标，并表明他们对贷款的未来持乐观态度。我们的结果在考虑内生性问题方面是稳健的，这些问题使用两阶段最小二乘回归和熵平衡方法以及文献中使用的“多重董事”的一些替代定义来解决。