According to Jonathan Quong’s moral status account of liability to defensive harm, an agent is liable to defensive harm only when she mistakenly treats others as if their moral status is diminished (for example, as if they lack a right that they in fact possess). Quong argues that, by the lights of the moral status account, a conscientious driver (Driver) who faultlessly threatens to kill Pedestrian is not liable to defensive harm. Quong argues that Driver’s action is evidence-relative permissible, despite the risks it imposes, because the general practice of prudent driving is permissible. The practice is permissible because (a) its risks do not disproportionately fall on some groups rather than others, (b) the threatened harms are incidental, and (c) the risk that driving imposes is acceptable in light of the benefits everyone derives from driving. Because the correct moral theory tells us that prudent driving is permissible, Pedestrian lacks a right that Driver refrain from driving. Hence, Driver does not, by driving, treat Pedestrian as lacking a right that Pedestrian in fact possesses. Driver is not liable to defensive force. I argue, against Quong, that cost–benefit analyses of types of risky activity cannot justify individual tokens of risk imposition. Actions that risk incidentally harming others must be justified by the prospective benefits of that token action. Hence, Driver’s imposition of risk on Pedestrian cannot be justified by the benefits of the general practice of driving. I argue that the permissibility of Driver’s imposing risk on Pedestrian via prudent driving turns on whether Driver is willing to internalise at least the foreseeable costs of that risky action. One can lack a right that a person refrain from performing a risky action whilst possessing a right not to be harmed by that risky action. Even if Pedestrian cannot reasonably demand that Driver refrain from driving, she can reasonably demand that Driver refrain from forcing her to bear the costs of his driving.

根据 Jonathan Quong 的道德状况描述在防御性伤害的责任中，只有当代理人错误地将他人视为道德地位降低（例如，好像他们缺乏他们实际上拥有的权利）时，她才可能遭受防御性伤害。Quong 认为，根据道德状况的说法，一个尽职尽责的司机 (Driver) 无误地威胁要杀死 Pedestrian 是不会受到防御性伤害的。Quong 认为，尽管存在风险，但司机的行为相对于证据而言是允许的，因为谨慎驾驶的一般做法是允许的。这种做法是允许的，因为 (a) 其风险不会不成比例地落在某些群体而不是其他群体身上，(b) 威胁的危害是偶然的，以及 (c) 考虑到每个人从驾驶中获得的好处，驾驶带来的风险是可以接受的. 因为正确的道德理论告诉我们谨慎驾驶是允许的，所以行人缺乏司机不开车的权利。因此，驾驶员不会通过驾驶将行人视为缺乏行人实际上拥有的权利。驾驶员不承担防御力。我反对 Quong，认为对风险活动类型的成本收益分析不能证明施加风险的单个代币是合理的。冒着意外伤害他人风险的行为必须以该代币行为的预期收益为理由。因此，驾驶员将风险强加给行人并不能用一般驾驶实践的好处来证明。我认为，驾驶员通过谨慎驾驶对行人施加风险的可允许性取决于驾驶员是否愿意至少内化该风险行为的可预见成本。一个人可能缺乏一种权利，即一个人避免执行危险行为，同时拥有不受该危险行为伤害的权利。即使行人不能合理地要求司机不要开车，她也可以合理地要求司机不要强迫她承担他的驾驶费用。