ABSTRACT

Fixed-income corporate bond markets were the last bastion of non-electronic trading activity. For most of the twentieth century these markets were also dominated by the largest Wall Street dealer-banks. These banks had long argued that corporate bonds were too complex and illiquid to be electronified. In reality though, opaque Over-The-Counter trading in these bonds allowed Wall Street to monopolise highly uncompetitive markets; this market environment had changed very little over the decades, despite the financial services revolutions that had gripped other markets. By the 2010s however, Wall Street banks had finally begun to lose their stranglehold. This paper tracks the two explanatory factors, the emergence of new financial technology and the decisive intervention of state managers and post-crisis regulation – in the form of the Volcker Rule and Basel III. Recent accounts have become increasingly sceptical of the disruptive, pro-competitive impact of fintech. We argue that – at least in markets for US corporate bonds – there is evidence of a more competitive, democratic market environment emerging as a direct result of new financial technologies.

摘要

固定收益公司债券市场是非电子交易活动的最后堡垒。在 20 世纪的大部分时间里，这些市场也被华尔街最大的交易银行所主导。这些银行长期以来一直认为，公​​司债券过于复杂且流动性不足，无法进行电子化。但实际上，这些债券的不透明场外交易让华尔街垄断了竞争激烈的市场；几十年来，尽管金融服务革命席卷了其他市场，但这种市场环境几乎没有改变。然而，到了 2010 年代，华尔街银行终于开始失去控制权。本文跟踪了两个解释性因素，新金融技术的出现以及国家管理者的果断干预和危机后监管——以沃尔克规则和巴塞尔协议 III 的形式。最近的报道越来越怀疑金融科技的破坏性、促进竞争的影响。我们认为——至少在美国公司债券市场——有证据表明，新金融技术的直接结果是出现了更具竞争力、更民主的市场环境。