Abstract Based on a circular product-space model with continuous time, we investigate a dynamic game in which each firm decides whether and when to adopt a flexible manufacturing system (FMS) at the beginning of the game and then chooses its quantity supplied at each time. We show that the equilibrium outcomes may be either joint adoption at the beginning of the game or sequential adoption, depending on the range of an initial adoption cost. For a given basic product, we find that a larger product differentiation decelerates the adoption of FMS. We also investigate competition behavior when the decisions on product locations are made endogenously and conduct welfare analysis, showing that there is market failure in the adoption timing choices.

中文翻译：

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采用柔性制造系统和产品差异化的时机

摘要 基于具有连续时间的循环产品空间模型，我们研究了一个动态博弈，其中每个公司在博弈开始时决定是否以及何时采用柔性制造系统（FMS），然后选择每次的供应量。 . 我们表明，均衡结果可能是游戏开始时的联合采用或顺序采用，具体取决于初始采用成本的范围。对于给定的基本产品，我们发现较大的产品差异会减慢 FMS 的采用。我们还调查了当产品位置的决定是内生的时的竞争行为并进行福利分析，表明采用时间选择存在市场失灵。