Abstract A vertically integrated provider (VIP) initially has a duty to deal with a rival at unregulated upstream and downstream prices in a Bertrand-Nash framework. The duty to deal is subsequently terminated which enables the VIP to acquire the rival and serve as a two-product, downstream monopolist. We find that the refusal to deal is efficiency-enhancing, given that prices decrease while profits increase ex post.

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关于在 Bertrand-Nash 框架中拒绝交易的效率收益的说明

摘要 垂直整合供应商 (VIP) 最初有责任在 Bertrand-Nash 框架中以不受监管的上游和下游价格与竞争对手打交道。交易义务随后终止，这使 VIP 能够收购竞争对手并充当两种产品的下游垄断者。我们发现拒绝交易会提高效率，因为事后价格下降而利润增加。