Abstract This paper studies consumer search behavior in markets where sellers must incur fixed costs to win a contract. We show that consumers face a commitment problem if their search intensities are not observed by sellers. Welfare is maximized when consumers can precommit to a limited number of searches, but in the absence of the ability to commit, consumers search more than the optimum. A decline in search costs can exacerbate the commitment problem and leave consumers potentially worse off.

中文翻译：

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搜索和投标成本

摘要 本文研究了在卖方必须承担固定成本才能赢得合同的市场中的消费者搜索行为。我们表明，如果卖家没有观察到消费者的搜索强度，他们就会面临承诺问题。当消费者可以预先承诺进行有限数量的搜索时，福利会最大化，但在缺乏承诺的情况下，消费者搜索的次数超过了最佳值。搜索成本的下降可能会加剧承诺问题，并使消费者的状况可能变得更糟。