Abstract This paper provides evidence on the effects of microfinance competition on moneylender interest rates and households' dependence on informal credit. The views among practitioners diverge sharply: proponents claim that the MFI competition reduces both the moneylender interest rate and households' reliance on informal credit, while critics argue the opposite. Taking advantage of recent econometric approaches to address selection on unobservables without imposing standard exclusion restrictions, we find that the MFI competition does not reduce moneylender interest rates, partially repudiating the proponents. There is no perceptible effect at low levels of the MFI coverage, but when the MFI coverage is high enough, the moneylender interest rate increases significantly. In contrast, a household's dependence on informal credit goes down after becoming an MFI member, which contradicts part of the critic's argument. The evidence is consistent with models where either the MFIs or the moneylenders engage in cream skimming, and fixed costs are important in informal lending.

中文翻译：

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小额信贷和放债人：小额信贷机构对孟加拉国非正规信贷市场的长期影响

摘要 本文提供了关于小额信贷竞争对放债人利率和家庭对非正规信贷依赖的影响的证据。从业者的观点分歧很大：支持者声称小额信贷机构竞争降低了放债人的利率和家庭对非正式信贷的依赖，而批评者则相反。利用最近的计量经济学方法在不施加标准排除限制的情况下解决不可观察变量的选择问题，我们发现 MFI 竞争不会降低放债人的利率，部分否定了支持者。小额信贷机构覆盖率低时没有明显影响，但当小额信贷机构覆盖率足够高时，放债人利率显着上升。相比之下，家庭' 成为小额信贷机构成员后，对非正式信贷的依赖下降，这与批评者的部分论点相矛盾。证据与小额信贷机构或放债人从事奶油撇脂的模型一致，固定成本在非正式贷款中很重要。