Recent years have seen the rise of pointed and influential critiques of deference doctrines in administrative law. What many of these critiques have in common is a view that judges, not agencies, should resolve interpretive disputes over the meaning of statutes—disputes the critics take to be purely legal and almost always resolvable using lawyerly tools of statutory construction. In this article, I take these critiques, and the relatively formalist assumptions behind them, seriously and show that the critics have not acknowledged or advocated the full reform vision implied by their theoretical premises. Specifically, critics have extended their critique of judicial abdication only to what I call Type I statutory errors (that is, agency interpretations that regulate more conduct than the best reading of the statute would allow the agency to regulate) and do not appear to accept or anticipate that their theory of interpretation would also extend to what I call Type II statutory errors (that is, agency failures to regulate as much conduct as the best reading of the statute would require). As a consequence, critics have been more than willing to entertain an end to Chevron deference, an administrative law doctrine which is mostly invoked to justify Type I error, but have not shown any interest in adjusting administrative law doctrine to remedy agencies’ commission of Type II error. The result is a vision of administrative law’s future that is precariously slanted against legislative and regulatory action. I critique this asymmetry in administrative law and address potential justifications of systemic asymmetries in the doctrine, such as concern about the remedial implications of addressing Type II error, finding them all wanting from a legal and theoretical perspective. I also lay out the positive case for adhering to symmetry in administrative law doctrine. In a time of deep political conflict over regulation and administration, symmetry plays, or at the very least could play, an important role in de-politicizing administrative law, clarifying what is at stake in debates about the proper level of deference to agency legal interpretations, and disciplining partisan gamesmanship. I suggest that when the conversation is so disciplined, an administrative law without deference to both Type I and Type II error is hard to imagine due to the high judicial costs of minimizing Type II error, but if we collectively choose to discard deference notwithstanding these costs, it would be a more sustainable political choice for administrative law than embracing the current, one-sided critique of deference.

中文翻译：

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对称的使命：制约美国行政法的政治化

近年来，对行政法中的尊重原则提出了尖锐而有影响力的批评。许多这些批评的共同点是，法官而不是代理机构应该解决关于法规含义的解释性争议——批评者认为这些争议是纯粹的法律争议，并且几乎总是可以使用法定解释的律师工具来解决。在这篇文章中，我认真对待这些批评，以及它们背后相对形式主义的假设，并表明批评者没有承认或提倡他们的理论前提所暗示的全面改革愿景。具体而言，批评者将他们对司法退位的批评扩展到我所说的第一类法定错误（即，监管更多行为的机构解释比最佳阅读法规将允许机构监管）并且似乎不接受或预期他们的解释理论也会扩展到我所说的第二类法定错误（即机构失败尽可能多地规范对法规的最佳解读所需要的行为）。因此，批评家们非常愿意结束雪佛龙的服从，这是一种行政法学说，主要用于证明第一类错误的合理性，但没有表现出任何兴趣调整行政法学说以补救机构的类型错误二错误。其结果是对行政法未来的愿景与立法和监管行动相悖。我批评了行政法中的这种不对称性，并解决了学说中系统性不对称性的潜在理由，例如对解决第二类错误的补救影响的担忧，从法律和理论的角度发现它们都不足。我还阐述了坚持行政法学说中的对称性的积极案例。在监管和行政方面存在深刻政治冲突的时代，对称性发挥或至少可以发挥重要作用，使行政法去政治化，澄清有关尊重机构法律解释的适当程度的辩论中的利害关系，并惩戒党派的游戏作风。我建议当谈话如此有纪律时，