We examine coordinated and unilateral effects of horizontal partial cross-ownership (PCO) in a laboratory experiment. We consider homogeneous Bertrand markets where firms have symmetric, non-controlling shares of each other, and conduct the experiment with both stranger and partner matching. The partner data (repeated game) confirm the prediction that firms are more (tacitly) collusive with PCO than without. In the stranger data (one-shot game), average prices are increasing with higher degrees of PCO. This is inconsistent with rather extreme Nash predictions for this setup. We show that in a Quantal Response Equilibrium firms’ incentives to compete are reduced with passive PCO. QRE predictions explain the data from the stranger treatment well.

我们在实验室实验中检查了水平部分交叉所有权 (PCO) 的协调和单边效应。我们考虑同质的 Bertrand 市场，其中公司之间具有对称的、非控制性的份额，并在陌生人和合作伙伴匹配的情况下进行实验。合作伙伴数据（重复博弈）证实了公司与 PCO 比没有更多（默认）勾结的预测。在陌生人数据（一次性游戏）中，平均价格随着 PCO 程度的提高而增加。这与此设置的相当极端的纳什预测不一致。我们表明，在量子响应均衡中，被动 PCO 降低了企业的竞争动机。QRE 预测很好地解释了来自陌生人治疗的数据。