In this paper, we consider whether third-party sellers on retail platforms are willing to disclose additional information to facilitate consumers' decision-making process. Interestingly, we find that even when the additional information is unfavorable to sellers, sellers may still have the incentive to disclose such information, since disclosing additional information can lower consumer uncertainty and alleviate price competition, which can benefit sellers. We also show that when the consumer uncertainty is low enough after one seller discloses additional information, prices of both products are higher than in the case when no seller discloses additional information.

中文翻译：

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零售平台第三方卖家信息披露策略

在本文中，我们考虑零售平台上的第三方卖家是否愿意披露额外信息以促进消费者的决策过程。有趣的是，我们发现即使附加信息对卖家不利，卖家可能仍然有披露此类信息的动机，因为披露额外信息可以降低消费者的不确定性并缓解价格竞争，从而有利于卖家。我们还表明，当一个卖家披露额外信息后消费者的不确定性足够低时，两种产品的价格都高于没有卖家披露额外信息的情况。