The rapid urbanization process has brought many pollution NIMBY facilities, and the associated pollution NIMBY conflicts have become one of the important factors restricting social stability. With the advent of the media era, new media has become the main channel for the public to recognize risks and master information, which greatly aggravates the social amplification effect of NIMBY conflict risk. In this case, it is of great significance to explore the interest relationship among the local government, the new media, and the local people and their roles in the NIMBY conflict. Based on the stakeholder theory, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of the local government, the new media, and the local people and carries out numerical simulation on the evolutionary model using MATLAB. The results show that the local government adopts a certain degree of regulatory strategy for the new media, the new media adopts the strategy of publicizing facts, and the local people adopts the strategy of nonresistance, which are the stable strategy points of the evolutionary game among the three stakeholders in the NIMBY conflict. The local government’s intervention in rumors to a certain extent is conducive to promoting the new media to publicize facts of the pollution NIMBY facilities and to restrain the local people’s choice of resistance strategies. The local government’s punishment to the new media spreading rumors should be kept above a certain level to restrain the new media spreading rumors. When the local people’s resistance reaches a certain level, the local government’s intervention will break down and the new media will become hyperactive. The results of this paper can provide some enlightenment for the stakeholders in pollution NIMBY conflicts and deepen the understanding of multiple interest conflicts and their resolution. Finally, this study proposes to build information sharing mechanism, information communication mechanism, trust mechanism, network governance mechanism, and public participation mechanism, so as to resolve the construction risk of pollution NIMBY facilities and improve the overall social welfare level.

中文翻译：

---

探索新媒体背景下污染邻避设施建设的冲突与解决：一种演化博弈论方法

快速的城市化进程带来了诸多污染邻避设施，与之相关的污染邻避冲突已成为制约社会稳定的重要因素之一。随着媒体时代的到来，新媒体成为公众认识风险、掌握信息的主要渠道，极大加剧了邻避冲突风险的社会放大效应。在这种情况下，探讨地方政府、新媒体和当地民众之间的利益关系及其在邻避冲突中的角色具有重要意义。本文基于利益相关者理论，构建了地方政府、新媒体和当地民众三方演化博弈模型，并利用MATLAB对演化模型进行了数值模拟。结果表明，地方政府对新媒体采取一定程度的规制策略，新媒体采取公开事实的策略，地方民众采取不抗拒的策略，这三者是演化博弈的稳定策略点。 NIMBY 冲突中的三个利益相关者。当地政府对谣言的干预在一定程度上有利于推动新媒体对污染邻避设施的事实进行宣传，约束当地民众对抵制策略的选择。地方政府对新媒体造谣的惩戒要保持在一定水平以上，以抑制新媒体造谣。当当地民众的抵抗力达到一定程度时，地方政府的干预将失效，新媒体将变得过度活跃。本文的研究结果可为污染邻避冲突的利益相关者提供一定的启示，加深对多重利益冲突及其解决的认识。最后，本研究提出建立信息共享机制、信息沟通机制、信任机制、网络治理机制和公众参与机制，以化解污染邻避设施建设风险，提高社会整体福利水平。